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addition, other key findings indicate that the controlling shareholders can
improve firm performance through the implementation of operational
efficiency com- mitment to environmental friendliness. The results of this
study support the position of the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, and
the legitimacy theory. Operational efficiency commitment to environmental
friendliness is then suggested to be a meaningful strategy for the firms to
obtain sustainable performance. Key words: controlling shareholders,
environmental performance, firm performance, monitoring, ope- rational
efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness. Introduction One
important goal of the firm is to maximize performance in current and future
days. The maximized firm performance will be increasing shareholders’
wealth (Gill et al., 2014). Modern firms that list their stock on a capital
market maximize their perfor- mance by separating functions of ownership
and control (Berle & Means, 1932). This separation may distinguish the
interests of the owner and the manager but can evoke among them a conflict
called agency conflict (Ross, 1973, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The conflict
across the groups of a firm, or the agency problem, is a conflict between the
owner (principal) and the manager (agent) when the manager has a greater
interest to pursue an individual goal rather than a firm goal (Sartono, 2012).
The agency problem can affect firm performance and force both the owner
and the manager to lose. One way to minimize the agency problems that
inflict the loss to investors is by requiring a firm owner to do monitoring (
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Monitoring refers to several efforts conducted by
the owner (principal) to reduce de- viant behavior of the manager (agent),
and these efforts may take several forms such as measuring, observing and
controlling the agent behavior through budget restriction, compensatory
policy, operational rule, and others. Insisting to enforce monitoring action and
also to protect their wealth from the agent’s deviant behavior, the owner may
strengthen control size by increasing share ownership (Grosfeld, 2006). When
control is held by a few investors, then it will be easier to proceed with the
control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Having bigger sharehold- ing and dominant
position, and also receiving wealth greater than other shareholders, the
controlling shareholders always have a strong incentive to collect information
about the firm’s condition, to monitor the manager to keep him/her
maximizing firm perfor- mance, and to ensure that the agency problem is
solved (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Claes- sens et al., 2002). Monitoring by
controlling shareholders is truly effective to reduce the agency conflict in
developing countries where the quality of corporate governance system is still
weak (Nguyen et al., 2015). Studies have been done lately concerning the
effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance, but the results are
varying. Some results show that monitoring by controlling shareholders is an
efficient tool to reduce the agency problem and also to improve firm
performance ( Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009, Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2010; Fa-
rooque et al., 2010; Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010; Caixe & Krauter, 2013;
Gaur et al., 2015; Hamadi & Heine, 2015; Li et al., 2015). Other results
identify that con- trolling shareholders do not affect firm performance
(Ahmed et al., 2012; Wahla et al., 2012; Warrad et al., 2013; Al-Saidi & Al-
Shammari, 2015). Such inconsistent results can be referred to as a fact that
there is a missing link be- tween controlling shareholders and firm
performance. Controlling shareholders’ mon- itoring has a direct effect on
firm performance on condition that there is no conflict of interest between
shareholders and other stakeholders. The firm owner (shareholders) always
wants a good return on their investment. On the other hand, firm
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sustainability does not merely depend on firm performance. The damage to
the natural environment due to the firm’s hostile activity may give
unfavorable impact on the firm’s long-term feasibility. The healthy
environment that is free of both pollution and damaging action is always vital
to stakeholders (government, environment conserver, and general com-
munity). Since a conflict of interest is possible between shareholders and
stakeholders, then the possible solution is giving certain rights by the firm to
certain stakeholders, and these rights represent the firm’s responsibility for
society and environment ( Jo et al., 2012). Some pieces of literature on
strategic management have claimed that firms apply- ing efficiency paradigm
into their operation will be potentially receiving benefits in the future and also
creating a sustainable competitive advantage (McWilliams & Smart, 1993).
Operational efficiency strategy also becomes a key to improving a firm’s
perfor- mance and competing for ability, to solving the agency conflict,
reducing production cost, and to increasing the firm value in the future (Baik
et al., 2013; Voulgaris & Lhem- onakis, 2014). The stakeholder theory asserts
that maximization of sustainable firm performance can be achieved by
integrating inherent interests of shareholders and stakeholders (Hill & Jones,
1992; Jensen, 2001). This integration refers to the integration between op-
erational efficiency strategy and environmental friendliness managerial
strategy. Some studies have found that environmental friendliness activities
can create efficiency and bring into the firm some economic values, such as
producing competitive advantage concerned with the more efficient
operational process, increasing productivity, and giv- ing lower cost of
environmental infarction (Hart, 1995, Porter & Linde, 1995, Majum- dar &
Marcus, 2001; Alexopoulos et al., 2011; Caracuel & Mandojana, 2013).
Environ- mental friendliness management can improve environmental
performance, and it shall be a solution for agency conflict (de Villiers et al.,
2011). Improving environmental performance can be potentially increasing
firm performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Iqbal et al., 2013; Wassmer et al.,
2014; Muhammad et al., 2015). The current study attempts to understand
the effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance through other
perspectives, namely the integration of operational ef- ficiency and
environmental performance concepts. The product of this integration is called
“operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness”, and this
new concept is expected to become a solution to discrepancies in the effect of
controlling shareholders’ monitoring on firm performance. Overall, the results
of this study show that the controlling shareholders positively influence the
operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness. The
controlling shareholder positively affects the firm performance in both ROA
and Tobin’s Q measures. The operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness has a positive effect on the firm performance in
both ROA and Tobin’s Q measures. In ad- dition, other key findings in the
study indicate that the controlling shareholders have an indirect effect on firm
performance (ROA & Tobin’s Q) through operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness. This study gives a significant contribution to
works of literature concerning the re- lationship between controlling
shareholders, environmental friendliness management concept, and firm
performance. The paper is arranged into six sections. The second section is
the literature review and hypotheses development. The methodology is dis-
cussed in the third section. Empirical results are provided in the fourth
section, while the fifth section is given for conclusion and discussion. The final
section focuses on limitation and possible improvement of the study in the
future. 1. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 1.1. The Effect of
Controlling Shareholders on Operational Efficiency Commitment To
Environmental Friendliness The stakeholder theory affirms that successful
relationship between stakeholders always involves creating and keeping trust.
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This trust shall be made and kept by the firm to ful- fill responsibilities, and
one responsibility is given to environment (Freeman, 1984). This theory also
declares that a firm’s motivation to be responsive to the environment issue
and improving environmental performance are shaped by pressure from
share- holders as one of the firm stakeholders ( James, 1994; Henriques &
Sadorsky, 1996). Some reasons stand behind shareholders’ interest toward
environmental friendliness management. These include (1) their worries that
a big fine for environmental infarc- tion may reduce profit, and (2) the
difficulty to generate capital or attract new investors if the firm has poor
environmental performance (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996). The agency
theory asserts that dominant shareholders as controlling shareholders can
influence operational strategic decisions and keep these decisions being more
sup- portive of the achievement of their goal (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
Through their domi- nance, controlling shareholders can put anyone in their
favor to any strategic posts, such as general director or financial director, and
by this authority, it must be easier for them to lead the firm’s activity to use
strategic policies to follow their aim (Francis et al., 2005). Controlling
shareholders differ from other shareholders in two aspects. First, con- trolling
shareholders are concerned with the long-term feasibility of the firm, and
sec- ond, it is important to them to maintain their reputation for the firm
(Anderson et al., 2003). It can be said that controlling shareholders gain
more chances than other share- holders in making strategic decisions to
maximize the firm’s behavior to attain econom- ic, social and environmental
goals. Controlling shareholders with majority sharehold- ing are more
facilitated to lead the manager to execute business activity committed to
environmental friendliness. Some empirical studies have explained the
presence of a positive relationship be- tween controlling shareholders and
environmental performance improvement. Earn- hart and Lizal (2006)
examined the effect of ownership structure and environmental performance in
the Czech Republic. Environmental performance is measured based upon the
level of air pollution emitted. Some pollutants are to be the issue, namely
car- bon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide, (SO2), particulates, and nitrogen
oxides (NOx). These chemicals are the most emitted and the most regulated
pollutions in the Czech Republic. The less is pollutant emission, the better is
environmental performance at the firm. Meanwhile, controlling shareholders
are measured by a number of the sharehold- ers with the biggest
shareholding. This study involves Czech-based firms listed on the Czech Stock
Exchange during the period of 1993–1998. The result shows that the more
concentrated is shareholders’ ownership, the better is environmental
performance. Chang (2013) conducted an empirical study in China and found
that China-based firms with concentrated ownership have higher voluntary
awareness toward environ- mental friendliness management, which is proved
by the higher level of environmen- tal performance disclosure. Sufian and
Zahan (2013) claimed that controlling share- holders deliver a positive impact
on CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) disclosure, which makes a firm have
a higher involvement in social and environmental activities. Crisostomo and
Freire ( 2015) carried out an empirical study in Brazil, and the re- sult
showed that controlling shareholders at Brazil firms have higher involvement
in CSR activities. The controlling shareholders show greater concern about
their name and reputation, and the policies to involve in CSR activities are
aimed to keep their image and reputation good at the firm. Furthermore,
Chang and Zhang (2015) ac- knowledged that the more concentrated is the
ownership, the greater is the capacity of controlling shareholders in
controlling and monitoring the manager in relation with the issue of the
operational cost needed to improve environmental performance. Stricter
control against environment cost shall increase the firm’s efficiency and
profitability. Taking into account all theoretical reviews and also empirical
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studies above, the fol- lowing hypothesis is then generated. H y p o t h e s i s
1 : Controlling shareholders have a positive effect on operational effi- ciency
commitment to environmental friendliness. 1.2 The Effect of Controlling
Shareholders on Firm Performance Controlling shareholders can be an
individual or a group but with the biggest share- holding, which gives
shareholders a dominant position over the others (Dallas, 2004). This position
can also be called as concentrated ownership. The concentrated owner- ship
may vary across the countries depending on the balance between the
enforcement of ownership rights by the government and by the firm owner
(Claessens et al., 2000). In the case of certain economic issues, if the
government fails to enforce effectively ownership rights, then the
enforcement will be taken over by the firm owner. Through such authority
shift, the firm owner determines how far is the firm contract to be im-
plemented, and this determination represents the ability and incentive to the
owner in defending their rights (Claessens et al., 2000). As already explained
in the agency theory, controlling shareholders refer to a mon- itoring
mechanism which can reduce the agency problem ( Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Controlling shareholders may increase their ownership to have more
control over the firm and the manager, and it can be done through voting
power or by representing their self into managerial position (Porta et al.,
1999). The less is the number of con- trolling shareholders, the more
concentrated is the ownership, and thus the easier it is for them to control
the manager to maximize firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
Therefore, it can be said that controlling shareholders are very influential in
the improvement of firm performance. Some empirical studies confirmed that
there is a positive effect from controlling shareholders on firm performance.
Jaafar and El-Shawa (2009) investigated the rela- tionship between
controlling shareholders and firm performance in several firms listed on the
Amman Stock Exchange, Jordania. Results of their study showed that
controlling shareholders have a positive effect on firm performance based on
measures of ROA and Tobin’s Q. The measurement of controlling
shareholders was done by determining a percentage of a shareholder with the
biggest share ownership, and five controlling shareholders were identified
with share ownership more than 5% of equity total. The study concluded that
controlling shareholders can improve firm performance by in- creasing their
monitoring of the manager and also by reducing the free rider issue. Nguyen
et al. (2015) examined the relationship between concentrated ownership and
firm performance in Singapore (an advancing country) and in Vietnam (a
devel- oping country). The results of their study indicated that concentrated
ownership has a positive effect on firm performance, and this effect is
moderated by national governance quality. It was found that the positive
effect of concentrated ownership on firm perfor- mance tends to be stronger
in the developing country (Vietnam) rather than in the advancing country
(Singapore). Tobin’s Q was used as a proxy for firm performance, while the
proxy for concentrated ownership was the biggest share ownership over 5 %.
It was concluded that concentrated ownership is an efficient mechanism of
corporate governance, which is possibly used when the quality of the national
governance system is weak. Gaur et al. (2015) conducted a study on the
relationship between controlling share- holders and firm performance. Their
study involves a sample of 167 firms listed on the New Zealand Stock
Exchange. Firm performance was measured with ROA, ROE, and ROS, while
controlling- hareholders were measured with the percentage of a shareholder
with the biggest ownership. The results of the study supported previous
findings that
controllingshareholderscanimprovefirmperformanceandreducetheagencyproblem.
Basedontheoreticalreviewsandempiricalstudiesabove,thefollowinghypotheses
aredeveloped. Hypothesis 2a: Controlling shareholders have a positive effect
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on firm perfor- mancebasedonROA. Hypothesis 2b: Controlling shareholders
have a positive effect on firm perfor- mancebasedonTobin’sQ. 1.3 The Effect
of Operational Efficiency Commitment to Environmental Friendliness on Firm
Performance The stakeholder theory declares that maximization of firm
performance cannot deny stakeholder interest ( Jensen, 2001). From the
perspective of the legitimacy theory, firms can strategically do the corporate
action to adapt to social and environmental values to obtain access to capital
sources (Aerts & Cormier, 2009). Increasing legitima- cy by respecting social
and environmental values indeed helps firms to gain access to capital
sources, either from the capital market or financial market. Firm performance
is not only measured with financial parameters but must also be integrated
with environmental performance before one finds out how much per-
formance is needed by firms (Saxena et al., 2003). High environmental
performance sends a signal that the firm has a strong environmental
management, and this indication increases equity value (share price). In
contrast, environmental crisis produces a signal that the firm has a poor
environmental management and usually, equity value declines as a result
(Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996). A signal showing that a firm has a strong en-
vironmental management is positively appreciated by the market, and it is
also helpful to increase the firm value. Some empirical studies have similar
findings indicating that operational efficiency commitment to environmental
friendliness can affect firm performance. These studies include Al-Tuwaijri et
al. (2004), Moneva and Ortas (2010), Purnomo et al. (2012), Gill et al.
(2014) and Muhammad et al. (2015). An empirical study by Al-Tuwaijri et al.
(2004) examined the relationship between environmental performance and
economic performance. Environmental performance was measured by the
percentage of the recy- cled waste total, while economic performance was
measured with annual share return. The results of the study showed that
environmental performance has a positive effect on economic performance.
Moneva and Ortas (2010) conducted an empirical study on the relationship
be- tween environmental performance and financial performance. It involved
230 Euro- pean firms, and it was found that improving environmental
performance potentially increases firm efficiency in consolidating financial
situation and answering stakeholder demand. Their study concluded that
environmental performance improvement will in- crease financial
performance. The same topic was investigated by Purnomo et al. (2012)
through a study involv- ing 50 firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
during the period of 2006–2010. Environmental performance was measured
with PROPER-based rank, while financial performance was measured with Net
Profit Margin. The results of their study indicated that firms with a good
environmental management system are those with the better environmental
performance, which in turn delivers a positive impact on financial per-
formance. Gill et al. (2014) affirmed that firms with capacity to increase
operational efficiency may generate a positive effect on their future
performance. Muhammad et al. (2015) discovered that environmental
performance positively impacts financial perfor- mance and firm value.
Regarding the description of theoretical reviews and empirical studies above,
the following hypotheses are made. H y p o t h e s i s 3 a : Operational
efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness has a positive effect on
firm performance based on ROA. H y p o t h e s i s 3 b : Operational
efficiency commitment to environmental friendli- ness has a positive effect on
firm performance based on Tobin’s Q. 1.4 Operational Efficiency Commitment
to Environmental Friendliness Mediates the Effect of Controlling Shareholders
on Firm Performance Jensen and Meckling (1976) clarified that agency
conflict can be reduced through sev- eral monitoring mechanisms. The
manager is subjected to such a mechanism, and one of them is a monitoring
mechanism by controlling shareholders. Controlling share- holders monitor
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the manager’s behavior and affect the manager to be more efficient in
making the investment and other operational tasks. Being efficient in
investment and operational activities will facilitate firms to achieve both
shareholder and managerial goals, and such achievement delivers good
impact by improving firm performance. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996)
implemented an empirical study and found that factors determining firm
responsiveness to the environment are positively affected by intervention or
pressure of stakeholders. One stakeholder with a strong position and great
influence is shareholders. Firms respond to the intervention by integrating
their strategic planning with the environment. The results of the analysis
indicated that firms with environment strategic plans have a higher ratio of
sale to asset compared to those without same plans. This study concluded
that environment strategic plans can increase the sale, which in turn
improves firm performance. Bruce (2011) declared that the biggest share
ownership (controlling shareholder) had a positive impact on efficiency
technique. However, controlling shareholders still care about minority
shareholders. Controlling shareholders represent a corporate gov- ernance
mechanism that persuades the manager to take decisions to maximize firm
performance in favor of shareholder interest. But not all of the controlling
sharehold- ers want the company more involved in environmentally friendly
activities, they are more focused how to obtain high profits*. This would
conflict with the interests of ex- ternal stakeholders with regard to corporate
responsibility towards society and envi- ronment. The controlling shareholder
must be able to integrate all stakeholder interests that may affect the firm
performance. Companies not only pursue financial benefits but also
contribute to social performance and environmental performance. Increased
firm performance in terms of both ROA and Tobin’s Q must go inherently with
increased environmental performance. The concept of operational efficiency
commitment to en- vironmental friendliness integrates the company’s
economic goals and environmental performance objectives. It is expected to
be a mediating solution of interest between shareholders and stakeholders.
Two hypotheses are written as follows based on the previous outline. H y p o
t h e s i s 4 a : Operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendli-
ness mediates the effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance
based on ROA. H y p o t h e s i s 4 b : Operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendli- ness mediates the effect of controlling shareholders
on firm performance based on Tobin’s Q. The summary of hypotheses is given
in Figure 1. H4(a; b) CONTROLLING H1 OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY H3(a; b)
SHAREHOLDERS COMMITMENT TO FIRM PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL
FRIENDLINESS H2(a; b) FIGURE 1. Summary of Hypotheses 2. Methodology
2.1 Data of the Sample The sample of this current study is non-financial firms
that list their share on the Indo- nesia Stock Exchange. The observation
involves the period 2010–2016. The follow- ing criteria were used to
determine the sample: (1) firms are consistently listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange and (2) the firms participated in the Environment Perfor-
mance Assessment Program (PROPER) from 2010 to 2016. Applying the two
criteria above, the resulting sample is 44 firms, comprised of 33 firms from
the manufactur- * The firm performance with high ROA or Tobin’s Q is not
always generated from the high environmental performance ing sector, 6
firms from the mining sector, 4 firms from the agriculture sector, and 1 firm
representing a conglomerate sector (miscellaneous). The study period
embraces 7 years. The total data panel, thus, is 308 (44 x 7). The data
source is secondary data panel consisting of financial statements and annual
reports of the firms listed on the Indone- sia Stock Exchange, and this panel
is obtained from the Indonesia Institute of Capital Market. Other sources of
data are PROPER Report, released by the Ministry of Life Environment and
Forestry of Indonesia Republic, which provides information about the firm’s
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rating on environmental performance. The data was collected both manually
and online. Manually the data was obtained by documenting at the stock
exchange of- fice Indonesia branch Semarang. Online data was downloaded
through www.idx.co.id (financial report) and www.menlh.go.id
(environmental performance report). 2.2 Variable Measurement 2.2.1 
Dependent Variable The dependent variable in this study is firm performance.
Two bases, namely account- ing base, and market value base, are used to
measure this variable. Accounting-based performance is measured with
Return On Asset (ROA), whereas market-based perfor- mance is measured
with Tobin’s Q (Lin, 2011; Warrad et al., 2013). ROA is obtained by dividing
net earnings by total assets. Tobin’s Q is derived from the addition of share’s
market value and debt total, and the result of this addition is divided by the
total asset. 2.2.2 Mediator Variable The mediator variable for this study is
operational efficiency commitment to environ- mental friendliness (OECEF). It
represents a firm’s ability to increase operational effi- ciency by improving
environmental performance. Operational efficiency committed to
environmental friendliness is a synthesis product from two concepts,
operational effi- ciency (Fairfield & Yohn, 2001; Soliman, 2008; Goel, 2012;
Gill et al., 2014; Santosu- osso, 2014) and Environmental Performance
(Purnomo et al., 2012; Sarumpaet et al., 2017; Angeliaa & Suryaningsih,
2015). Thus, it can be said that operational efficiency committed to
environmental friendliness is a strategic integration of the economic goal and
environmental goal to improve firm performance. There must be a
harmonious relationship between operational efficiency strategy and
environmental friendliness management strategy. Integration of these
strategies shall be able to improve firm per- formance. Operational efficiency
commitment to environmental friendliness can be attained through
operational control innovation and also through efforts to improve a firm’s
environmental performance such as decreasing environmental pollution,
reducing emission waste, managing for energy efficiency, enforcing the
application of 3R (Re- use, Reduce, Recycle) for B3 solid and non-solid
wastes, protecting biodiversity, and conducting a community development
program (Djajadiningrat et al., 2014; PROPER, 2015). Operational Efficiency
Commitment To Environmental Friendliness is meas- ured with integration of
two indicators, Asset Turnover (Fairfield & Yohn, 2001; Soli- man, 2008; Goel,
2012; Gill et al., 2014; Santosuosso, 2014; Voulgaris & Lhemonakis, 2014)
and PROPER-based environmental performance rating (Purnomo et al., 2012;
Sarumpaet et al., 2017; Angeliaa & Suryaningsih, 2015). Briefly, operational
efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness (OECEF) is written as
follows: OECEF = Asset Turnover X Environmental Performance OECEF =
Sales x PROPER Score Asset Turnover PROPER Score is determined based on
environmental performance rating re- leased by the Ministry of Life
Environment of Indonesia Republic (PROPER, 2011). PROPER rating can be
written as follows: (1) Golden Rating: Very Good; Score=5; (2) Green Rating:
Good; Score=4; (3) Blue Rating: Adequate; Score=3; (4) Red Rat- ing: Bad;
Score=2; and (5) Black Rating: Very Bad; Score=1. PROPER is a platform for
environment-based economic practice in Indonesia, and it contains some
important yardsticks, including Environment Management System, Energy
Efficiency, Emission Reduction, 3R for Solid and Non-Solid Wastes (B3), Bi-
odiversity Protection, and Community Development. This platform is used to
assess operational congruence of a certain industry to life environment, and
at least, to keep firms focusing on environment conservation while doing the
economic activity (Dja- jadiningrat et al., 2014). 2.2.3 Independent Variable
The independent variable is controlling shareholders (CS), who are mostly
few in num- ber but holding the majority of shares, which gives them a
dominant position over the others (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Dallas,
2004). Controlling shareholders are prox- ied with the level of the biggest
10/25/2018 Turnitin
file:///C:/Users/TOSHIBA/Documents/Jurnal%20untuk%20LK/Hasil%20uji%20turnitin/Turnitin_Originality_Report_1025041899.html 9/18
share ownership either held by an individual or insti- tution above 5% of all
shares circulating (Earle et al., 2004; Dwaikat & Queiri, 2014; Jaafar & El-
Shawa, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). 2.2.4 Control Variable The current study
uses two control variables, namely firm size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV), and
many previous studies have used these two. SIZE and LEV reinforce the
relationship between controlling shareholders with operational efficiency
committed to environmental friendliness and firm performance. Both SIZE
and LEV are used by empirical studies to control environment management
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Earnhart & Lizal, 2006; Cong & Freedman,
2011; Zou et al., 2015) and firm perfor- mance (Krivogorsky & Grudnitski,
2010; Desoky & Mousa, 2013). Firm size is count- ed by the natural
logarithm of total assets, while leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt
to the total assets. 2.3 Analysis Model Analysis technique of variance-based
SEM, also called Partial Least Squares (PLS- SEM), is used for a few reasons
(Sholihin & Ratmono, 2013). First, the model to the study is very complex
involving more than one dependent variable. Second, theories utilized for this
study are classified as new, and therefore, the proper way to examine them is
by using PLS-SEM. Third, PLS-SEM can only work efficiently on a small sam-
ple size and a complex model. The study uses WarpPLS 6.0 for examining
PLS-SEM model. For testing H1, H2(a,b), H3(a,b), and H4(a,b), the model
equation can be written as follows: OECEFt = α1+ β1CSt + β2SIZEt +
β3LEVt+ ϵ1 ROAt = α2+ β4CSt + β5SIZEt + β6LEVt+ β7OECEFt+ ϵ2 Tobins
Qt = α2+ β8CSt + β9SIZEt + β10LEVt + β11OECEFt + ϵ3 (1) (2) (3) 3.
Results 3.1 Description and Correlation Table 1 displays descriptive data of
variables, which include Minimum Score, Maximum Score, Mean, and
Standard Deviation. It is shown in the table that shared ownership of
dominant controllers usually remains above 50% (0.74). The sample contains
mostly big firms (28.77), where the capital structure is funded by debt above
30% (0.44). The variable of operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness (OECEF) indicates that firms have managed
environment based on laws and regulations, and thus, it can be said that
firms already possess good operational efficiency (3.42). The variable TABLE
1. Descriptive statistics of variables studied Variable Min Max Mean SD
Shareholder Control (SC) 0.32 1.00 0.74 0.15 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.20 33.20
28.77 1.76 Leverage (LEV) 0.04 1.49 0.44 0.20 Operational Efficiency
Commitment to Environmental Friendliness (OECEF) 0.05 12.46 3.42 1.92
ROA -51.60 43.93 8.17 11.20 Tobin’s Q 0.33 18.92 2.32 3.07 Source:
Indonesia Stock Exchange of firm performance based on accounting (ROA)
shows that firms have attained the profit goal (8.17), while firm performance
based on market value (Tobin’s Q) indicates that the market value of the
firms is higher than the asset value (2.32). Table 2 shows the result of matrix
correlation of all study constructs. It indicates that controlling shareholders
have a positive correlation both with operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness and with Tobin’s Q (significant at the level of
0.001 and 0.05), but have a negative correlation with firm size (significant at
the level of 0.001). Firm size correlates positively with operational efficiency
commitment to environmental friendliness, ROA and Tobin’s Q (significant at
the level of 0.001), but correlates negatively with leverage (significant at the
level of 0.05). On the other hand, leverage correlates negatively with ROA
(significant at the level of 0.001). More- over, the variable of operational
efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness has a positive correlation
with ROA and Tobin’s Q, and ROA correlates positively with Tobin’s Q
(significant at the level of 0.001). There is no strong correlation between ex-
planatory variables, and therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue. TABLE 2.
Correlation matrix of the main constructs Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 1. SC 1 2. SIZE
–0.233*** 1 3. LEV –0.016 –0.140** 1 4. OECEF 0.211*** 0.219*** –0.041
1 5. ROA 0.087 0.475*** –0.311*** 0.611*** 1 6. Tobin’s Q 0. 166** 0.
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315*** –0. 008 0. 587*** 0. 717*** 1 ***, **, * denote significance levels
at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange 3.2
The Results of PLS-SEM Analysis PLS-SEM analysis process involves five
stages, including conceptualization of the mod- el, determination of the
algorithm analysis method, determination of the resampling method,
delineation of the path diagrams, and evaluation of the model. Since WarpPLS
is used to determine the algorithm analysis method, there are two algorithms
that must be considered before analyzing the model, and these two are the
outer model and the inner model. In concert with the outer model, this study
chooses PLS regression because it has a capacity to process data with
collinearity issue (Latan & Ghozali, 2016). After determining the analysis
method for the outer model, it is contin- ued with the setting for the inner
model. This study gives a choice to the linear method because all hypotheses
in the model indicate a linear relationship. The most important step before
evaluating a model in PLS-SEM analysis is deter- mining the resampling
method. Resampling is a procedure to reset the sample when the estimated
significance value of the PLS model remains unknown (Latan & Ghozali,
2016). Two methods of resampling are usually used, namely bootstrap and
jackknifing. The current study prefers to use the bootstrap because it is more
stable when it is ap- plied to a sample of more than 100 genuine members
(Latan & Ghozali, 2016). Evaluating a model in PLS-SEM involves two stages.
It begins with the evaluation of the measurement model and then continues
with the evaluation of the structural model. The evaluation of the
measurement model is done by assessing reliability and validity of indicators
that constitute latent constructs. The evaluation of the structural model is
conducted to predict the relationship across latent variables, to understand
how many variances are explained by latent variables, and to find out the
significance level of p-value (Latan & Ghozali, 2016). It should be noted that
evaluation of the measurement model is not implemented in this study
because the studied variable is classified as a manifest variable. Thus, it is
not necessary to assess reliability and validity of the construct measurement.
3.3 Evaluation of the Structural Model (ROA-based Firm Performance) The
examination of the structural model starts with the evaluation of goodness-
of-fit of the study model concerning ROA-based firm performance. The results
of goodness-of- fit evaluation are shown in Table 3. TABLE 3. Goodness-of-Fit
of Structural Model (ROA-based Firm Performance) Criteria Parameter 
Average path coefficient (APC) 0.245*** Average R-squared (ARS) 0.338***
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS) 0.331*** Average block VIF (AVIF)
1.092 Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF) 1.911 Tanenhaus GoF (GoF) 0.582
Sympson’s paradox ratio (SPR) 0.857 R-squared contribution ratio (RSCR)
1.000 Statistical suppression ratio (SSR) 0.857 Nonlinear bivariate causality
direction ratio (NLBCDR) 0.857 ***, **, * denote significance levels at
0.001, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange As
indicated by Table 3, the study model has a good fit because p-values for
APC, ARS, and AARS are < 0.001; precisely APC = 0.245, ARS = 0.338 and
AARS = 0.331. Both AVIF and AFVIF values are < 3.3, meaning that there is
no multicollinearity issue across indicators and across exogenous variables.
Moreover, GoF is obtained as 0.507, which is > 0.36, and therefore, it
remains in a big category, which means that the model fit is very good.
Concerning SPR, SSR, and NLBCDR, all values are the same, precisely 0.857,
which is > 0.70. Meanwhile, RSCR value is 1.000, which is > 0.90, and thus,
it is acceptable, meaning that there is no causality problem in the model
(Latan & Ghozali, 2016). The result of the estimated relationship between
constructs and both variance size and effect size are displayed in Table 4.
TABLE 4. The result of the Structural Model Evaluation (ROA-based Firm
Performance) Description Path Path Coefficient R 2 Q 2 Effect Size Standard
Error CS à OECEF 0.278*** 0.112 0.128 0.059 0.049 SIZE à OECEF
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0.284*** 0.062 0.057 LEV à OECEF 0.003 0.000 0.054 CS àROA 0.053*
0.550 0.557 0.005 0.038 SIZE à ROA 0.341*** 0.162 0.045 LEV à ROA –
0.242*** 0.075 0.054 OECEF à ROA 0.515*** 0.315 0.057 ***, **, *
denote significance levels at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. Path
coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors Source: Indonesia
Stock Exchange As shown in the above table, the value of adjusted R-squared
(R2) for operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness is
0.112. This value belongs to a small category (<0.25) and it means that only
11.2 % variances can be explained by the independent variable. The value of
adjusted R-squared (R2) for ROA is 0.55. This value remains in a strong
category (<0.70), meaning that both independent and mediation variables
have explained the variances by 55%. Q-squared values for variables of
operational efficiency commitment to environ- mental friendliness and ROA
are 0.128 (>0) and 0.557 (>0), which means that the model has predictive
validity. The effect size from controlling shareholders on ROA is valued at
0.005 (<0.02), meaning that it does not have the effect size. Moreover, the
ef- fect size of operational efficiency commitment to environmental
friendliness on ROA is the biggest of all variables (0.315), and therefore, it
can be said that operational efficien- cy commitment to environmental
friendliness plays an important role in determining accounting-based (ROA-
based) firm performance. The results of the estimated relationship across the
constructs show that con- trolling shareholders have a significant positive
effect on operational efficiency com- mitment to environmental friendliness,
and it is proved by the path coefficient value of 0.278. This result means that
Hypothesis 1 is supported. It also supports previous studies, which indicate
that controlling shareholders have more opportunities to take strategic
decisions to maximize firm behavior to attain economic, social and environ-
mental goals (Earnhart & Lizal, 2006; Chang, 2013; Chang & Zhang, 2015;
Crisos- tomo & Freire, 2015). Next, the results of estimation also indicate
that controlling shareholders have a sig- nificant positive effect on ROA as
shown by the path coefficient value of 0.053. It means that Hypothesis 2a is
supported, and it also confirms the study conducted by Gaur et al. (2015)
and Jaafar and El-Shawa (2015), who found that controlling shareholders can
be a proper mechanism to monitor managers and to drive them toward
improving ROA-based firm performance. Moreover, the results of the analysis
show that operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness
has a positive significant effect on ROA. The path coeffi- cient value is 0.515,
which supports Hypothesis 3a. The results of analysis also indicate that firms
with good environmental performance are those with the capability to main-
tain firm efficiency and also to improve financial performance (Moneva &
Ortas, 2010; Purnomo et al., 2012; Gill et al., 2014; Muhammad et al.,
2015). Mediation testing is conducted to examine Hypothesis 4a to answer
the question “whether operational efficiency commitment to environmental
friendliness has medi- ated the effect of controlling shareholders on ROA”.
The current study uses Variance Accounted For (VAF) method for this test.
According to Hair et al. (2013), VAF meth- od is considered as more suitable
over other methods for mediation testing in PLS- SEM analysis because PLS-
SEM requires the use of the resampling method and does not need any
assumptions about variable distribution. Therefore, VAF method can be
applied to a sample of a small size. Mediation testing with VAF method
involves some procedures: (1) The direct effect of exogenous variable on
endogenous variable is test- ed without involving the mediation variable; (2)
If the direct effect of exogenous var- iable on endogenous variable is
significant, then it is continued by testing the indirect effect of the exogenous
variable on the endogenous variable with the involvement of the mediation 
variable; (3) Finally, if the indirect effect of the exogenous variable on the
endogenous variable is significant, then the VAF value is counted to find out
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the size of mediation effect. The following criteria are considered: a. If VAF is
> 80%, there must be full mediation. b. If 20% < VAF < 80%, there is partial
mediation. c. If VAF < 20%, there is no mediation effect on the model.
Variance Accounted For (VAF) can be obtained by dividing the indirect effect
by the total effect (the addition of the direct effect to the indirect effect). The
direct effect of controlling shareholders on ROA without a mediation variable
has been tested, and the result shows that the effect is positively significant
(p-value < 0.001) with the path coefficient value of 0.196. It continues with
the testing on the in- direct effect of controlling shareholders (CS) on ROA
through the mediation variable, namely operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness (OECEF). The result of this indirect effect testing is
that the effect is significant (p-value < 0.001), with the path coefficient value
of 0.143. Next procedure is to calculate the VAF value to determine whether
there is media- tion effect or not. The VAF value and its constituents are
presented in Table 5. TABLE 5. VAF Calculation for the Effect of CS on ROA
through OECEF Mediation Indirect effect 0.143 Direct effect 0.196 Total effect
0.339 VAF (indirect effect/total effect) 0.247 Source: Indonesia Stock
Exchange Table 5 shows that VAF value is 0.247, or 24.7%. This value
remains within the cat- egory of partial mediation (20% < VAF < 80%), and
therefore, it supports Hypothesis 4a. Based on this finding, it can be said that
controlling shareholders can improve firm performance by directing the firm
to implement the strategy or concept of operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness. 3.4 Evaluation of the Structural Model (Tobin’s Q-
based Firm Performance) Goodness-of-fit of the model concerning Tobin’s Q-
based firm performance has been evaluated, and the result is presented in
Table 6. TABLE 6. Goodness-of-Fit of the Structural Model (Tobin’s Q-based
Firm Performance) Criteria Parameter Average path coefficient (APC)
0.211*** Average R-squared (ARS) 0.257*** Average adjusted R-squared
(AARS) 0.249*** Average block VIF (AVIF) 1.092 Average full collinearity
VIF (AFVIF) 1.911, Tanenhaus GoF (GoF) 0.507 Sympson’s paradox ratio
(SPR) 0.714 R-squared contribution ratio (RSCR) 0.999 Statistical
suppression ratio (SSR) 0.714 Nonlinear bivariate causality direction ratio
(NLBCDR) 0.714 ***, **, * denote significance levels at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1,
respectively. Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange In this model, all p-values for
APC, ARS and AAR are < 0.001; namely, APC = 0.211, ARS = 0.257 and
AARS = 0.249. The values of both AVIF and AFVIF are < 3.3, which means
that multicollinearity issue does not exist across indicators and across the
exogenous variables. GoF value is 0.507 (>0.36), meaning that the model
has a very good fit. The values of SPR, SSR, and NLBCDR are similar,
precisely 0.714 (>0.70). RSCR is valued at 0.999 (>0.90), which means that
causality problem does not exist in the model. The estimated relationship
between the constructs and both variance size and effect size within this
model are shown in Table 7. TABLE 7. The result of the Structural Model
Evaluation (Tobin’s Q-based Firm Performance) Description Path Path
Coefficient R2 Q2 Effect Size Standard Error CS àTobins Q 0.113** 0.386
0.395 0.019 0.047 SIZE à Tobin’s Q 0.235*** 0.074 0.048 LEV à Tobin’s Q
0.048 0.000 0.042 OECEF à Tobin’s Q 0.513*** 0.301 0.071 ***, **, *
denote significance levels at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. Path
coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors Source: Indonesia
Stock Exchange Based on the table above, the obtained value of adjusted R-
squared (R2) in Tobin’s Q model is 0.386. It resides in moderate category
(<0.45) and also means that the pro- portion of variance explained by the
independent and mediation variables is 38.6%. Q-squared value is 0.395 (>
0), meaning that Tobin’s Q model fulfills predictive valid- ity. Effect size from
controlling-shareholders on Tobin’s Q is 0.02, which means that the model
has an effect size. Furthermore, the effect size of operational efficiency com-
mitment to environmental friendliness on Tobin’s Q is the biggest of all
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(0.301), and it is then reasonable to say that operational efficiency
commitment to environmental friendliness has an important role in
determining firm performance based on market value (Tobin’s Q). All path
coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors. The relationship
between the constructs has been estimated, and it shows that con- trolling-
shareholders have a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q as indicated by the
path coefficient value of 0.113. It supports Hypothesis 2b and also confirms
the results obtained by Nguyen et al. (2015) and Jaafar and El-Shawa (2015)
stating that con- trolling shareholders can affect the firm management to
maximize market value-based (Tobin’s Q-based) firm performance. In
addition, the result of estimated relationship across the constructs supports
Hy- pothesis 3b, meaning that operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendli- ness has a positive significant effect on Tobin’s Q, and
it is shown by the path coefficient value of 0.513. This position is consistent
with Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), who deduced that firms with good
environmental performance will transmit a signal of a strong environmental
management, and this signal may increase share price (firm val- ue). The
statement above also justifies Muhammad et al. (2015), who summarized
that environmental performance has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q.
Verification of Hypothesis 4b involves a mediation test, and this test is
needed to ensure “whether operational efficiency commitment to
environmental friendliness me- diates the effect of controlling shareholders
on Tobin’s Q”. VAF method has been used for testing the ROA model, and it is
also used for testing Tobin’s Q model. Then, the direct effect of controlling
shareholders on Tobin’s Q without mediation is tested with VAF, and the result
indicates that the effect is positively significant (p-value < 0.001) with the
path coefficient value of 0.255. VAF is also used for testing the indirect effect
of controlling shareholders on Tobin’s Q through the mediation variable, i.e.
operational efficiency commitment to environ- mental friendliness. The results
of this mediation test show that the effect is significant (p-value < 0.001),
with the path coefficient value of 0.143. Next step to calculate VAF value is to
determine whether the mediation effect does indeed exist or does not exist,
and VAF count can be seen in Table 8. TABLE 8. VAF Calculation for the Effect
of CS on Tobin’s Q through OECEF Mediation Indirect effect 0.143 Direct
effect 0.255 Total effect 0.398 VAF (indirect effect/total effect) 0.359 Source:
Indonesia Stock Exchange As shown in Table 8, VAF is valued at 0.359, or
35.9 %, and therefore, mediation effect exists in partial mediation category
(20% < VAF < 80%). This result supports Hypothesis 4b. It can be asserted
that controlling shareholders can improve the market value of the firm
(Tobin’s Q) indirectly through applying the concept of operational efficiency
committed to environmental friendliness. Conclusion This study is aimed to
investigate the effect of controlling shareholders’ monitoring on firm
performance through the implementation of operational efficiency
commitment to environmental friendliness. It is said that operational
efficiency commitment to envi- ronmental friendliness is a product of
integration of the operational efficiency concept and the environmental
performance concept. Seven hypotheses have been made based on several
sources, including theoretical sources such as agency theory, stakeholder
theory and legitimacy theory, and also academic sources involving the results
of previ- ous empirical studies. The results of this study show that controlling
shareholders have a positive impact on commitment to environmental
friendliness of the firm management. The implemen- tation of environmental
friendliness activities may create efficiency in firm operation, increase
productivity, and reduce the cost of environmental infarction (Hart, 1995;
Porter & Linde, 1995; Majumdar & Marcus, 2001; Alexopoulos et al., 2011;
Carac- uel & Mandojana, 2013). This result supports the stakeholder theory,
which states that motivations of the firm to be responsive to the environment
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and also to improve envi- ronmental performance emerge usually due to the
pressure of a shareholder as one of the important stakeholders ( James,
1994; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996). Controlling shareholders always have a
great interest to produce environmental friendliness man- agement, at least
to keep their good reputation and to create favorable long-term sus-
tainability. Another important conclusion is that controlling shareholders can
be the effective monitoring mechanism to compel firm management to
improve firm performance. This result corroborates the agency theory, which
asserts that controlling shareholders are one of the monitoring mechanisms
at the firm that can reduce the agency problem ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Controlling shareholders in the developing countries, in- cluding Indonesia,
where corporate governance usually remains weak, often take in- itiative to
take over the control of management in order to protect their wealth. It is
consistent with Claessens et al. (2000), who said that if the government at a
certain economic issue cannot effectively enforce ownership rights, then the
firm owner will take a lead to dominate this enforcement. This study also
demonstrates that firms with environmental friendliness commit- ment are
receiving great economic contribution to their business, having their opera-
tional performance increased, and most importantly, finding their market
value-based performance improved. This finding sustains the stakeholder
theory, which says that the process of firm performance maximization will
proceed without neglecting stake- holder interest ( Jensen, 2001). Moreover,
the current study supports the perspective of legitimacy theory, which
affirmed that firms conducting corporate action to adapt with social and
environmental values are given easier course to access capital sources (Aerts
& Cormier, 2009). Easy access to capital sources will be potentially improving
firm performance. The results of the mediation test indicate that controlling
shareholders’ monitoring has a direct effect on performance output, while the
indirect effect of this monitoring on performance is made through the concept
of operational efficiency commitment to environmental friendliness.
Controlling shareholders indeed can improve firm perfor- mance by putting
pressure on the firm management to implement operational efficien- cy
commitment to environmental friendliness. Indeed, the environmental
friendliness managerial strategy has been proved as the determinant factor
behind the favored firm performance, either based on accounting measure
(ROA-based) or market value meas- ure (Tobin’s Q-based). Limitation The
limitation of this study should be noted. The selected sample is non-financial
firms dominantly coming from the manufacturing sector (75%). The number
of the firms from other sectors is lower than the manufacturing sector, for
instance, only 14 % from the mining sector, 9% from the agriculture sector,
and other 2% from other sectors. Also, not many firms were found joining the
Environmental Performance Assessment Program (PROPER) during the study
period. Consequently, all results from this study cannot be generalized to the
non-financial sector entirely. Next study is could provide a complete
description of non-financial firms and also be more inclusive by involving
other sectors as the sample in a proportional way. References Aerts, W., &
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